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Article 8

THE GANG OF FIVE & THE SECOND COMING OF
AN ANTI-RECONSTRUCTION SUPREME COURT
John E. Nowak*
I.

WARNIrG: 1990s "FEDERALISTS" MAY CONSIDER TIs ESSAY
DANGEROUS TO YOUR MENTAL HEALTH

Because I am a great admirer of the late Professor Fred Rodell,
this Essay will be just that: an essay, not a law review article. If you
want a traditional law review treatment of the June 23, 1999 decisions
of the Supreme Court, you will need to look elsewhere. You will not
find detailed analysis of judicial opinions or a politically neutral view
of the Rehnquist Court in this Essay.
I should tell you up front that my view of the "Gang of Five"
(ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas) that has controlled Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s
mirrors Fred Rodell's view of the late nineteenth-century Supreme
Court. To quote the late Professor:
The Justices had been busily perverting the plain intent of the Fourteenth Amendment-and the Fifteenth Amendment too ....
Through the 1860's and 187 0's, Congress had passed a series of laws
designed to put teeth into the otherwise empty words of the postwar Amendments ....
[T]he Court imperiously and impatiently
swept aside almost all of these so-called Civil Rights Acts, either by
flatly branding them-unconstitutional-no matter that the Constitution had been amended precisely to achieve what these laws were
aimed to achieve-or by using legalistic chop-logic to "interpret"
them out of effective existence.'
David C. Baum Professor of Law, University of Illinois. I would like to thank
Professor Janis Johnson, Director of the University of Illinois Law Library, and Mr.
Hal Southern of our law library staff for their help in securing many of the materials
cited in this Essay. I also want to thank Professor Alfred L. Brophy, Oklahoma City
*

University School of Law, for providing me with the information concerning the
killing of minority race persons in Oklahoma and Florida that appears infranote 59.
Special thanks goes to my secretary, Mrs. S. Cook, for her assistance to an old
professor who has not adapted to the computer/word-processing era.
1 FRE RODELL, NmE MEN 165-66 (1955). My views, as expressed in this Essay,
are similar to the views of two of my favorite legal realists: the late Professor Fred

1092

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 75:3

II. WHO CARES ABOUT THE JUNE 23 CASES?
I must admit that I do not have much interest in the Eleventh
Amendment anymore. When I last wrote about the Eleventh Amendment a quarter-century ago, 2 I was young enough to be writing traditional law review articles. I was naive enough that I thought that the
Court would return to the original intent of the framers and ratifiers
of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments to recognize Congress's
authority to create a variety of causes of action against state
governments.8
A lot of trees have been killed in the intervening quarter-century
to publish articles and books by scholars examining both historical
and functional approaches to interpreting the Eleventh Amendment.
Rodell and the late Judge Jerome Frank. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND (1930). Professor Rodell andJudge Frank held different "realist views"
about the nature ofjudicial rulings. See generallyROBERTJ. GLENNON, THE ICONOcLAsT
AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK's IMPACr ON AmE~icAN LAW (1985). For an overview of
the development of legal realism and a sampling of writings from legal realist scholars, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher et al. eds., 1993). In other
speeches and essays, I have attempted to resurrect Professor Rodell's brand of legal
realism in analyzing constitutional issues. SeeJohn E. Nowak, Foreword: Evaluatingthe
Work of the New LibertarianSupreme Court, 7 HAmTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 263 (1980);John E.
Nowak, ProfessorRodell, the Burger Court, and PublicOpinion, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 107
(1983).
Although one would never guess it by the number of footnotes in this Essay, I
really hate footnotes. I made that point in John E. Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27 ARIz. L. REv. 317 (1985). I swiped that title from one of my heroes, the late
Professor Fred Rodell. Unlike Professor Rodell, I do not have the courage of my
convictions, and I will give citations to what I believe are relevant authorities throughout this Essay. The reader need not read any of the notes to evaluate the substantive
arguments presented in this Essay. I take some solace in the fact that Judge Abner
Mikva, a former student of Professor Rodell, as well as a noted scholar and jurist, has
also made some accommodation to the need to use notes to support statements in law
reviews today. BecauseJudge Mikva is a person of more character than myself, he has
made less of a departure from Professor Rodell's approach to legal writing than I
have. Compare Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 647 (1985)
(arguing against the importance of footnotes in legal writing), with AbnerJ. Mikva &
Jeff Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REv. 729 (1991) (recognizing
the usefulness of footnotes only as means of citation).
2 See John E. Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975).
3 For a listing of books and articles on the l1th Amendment, see the footnotes
in John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L.
REV. 47 (1998), Kit Kinports, Implied WaiverAflerSeminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REv. 793
(1998), andJames F. Pfander, History and State Suability:An "Explanatory"Accountof the
Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998).
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Most, though not all, scholars have found reasons why Congress
should have the power to create private courses of action against state
governments. Nevertheless, if we set the academic debate aside, there
is not much reason to be concerned about the Eleventh Amendment.
As Professor Jeffries, in an excellent examination of the relationship
of the Eleventh Amendment to basic civil rights legislation, has concluded, "IF]or all its virtues, Eleventh Amendment scholarship ne4
glects a crucial fact: the Eleventh Amendment almost never matters."
On June 23, 1999, a five Justice majority in Alden v. Maine5 created an Eleventh Amendment-like immunity for state governments
from suits that are based on federal legislation. Indeed, the reasoning
in Alden, such as it is, mirrors the reasoning used by the Gang of Five
in two Eleventh Amendment decisions announced on the same day as
6
Alden and in their earlier decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.
The "bottom line" of the June 23 decisions7 is (1) state governments, but not local governments, are protected from suits for monetary damages or other forms of retroactive relief brought by private
persons (rather than the federal government or another state); (2)
private persons, as well as government entities, may bring suits for various forms of prospective relief to require state officers to conform the
practices of state governments with federal law; (3) private parties may
maintain suits for money damages against state officers or state employees who violate federal law, although such suits may be difficult to
maintain if the state is seen as the real party in interest; and (4) Congress may create private causes of action against state governments (to
be heard in federal or state courts) if Congress clearly states its intention to do so and if the legislation comes within Congress's authority
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
If the results of the cases can be so easily summarized, and if the
Court only slightly expanded the immunity it had created for states in
prior cases, why write about the cases? Despite their narrow holdings,
the cases are important because the opinions in these cases reflect
Anti-Reconstruction, and to some extent Anti-Federalist, "philosophy"
that has been adopted and imposed on our country by the Gang of
Five.
4
5
6
7

Jeff-ies, supra note 3, at 49.
119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
The two June 23 decisions concerning the Eleventh Amendment are College

Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219
(1999), and !;oridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducationExpense Boardv. College SavingsBank,

119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
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In the June 23 decisions of the Supreme Court we can hear the
voice of the Court that decided Hans v. Louisiana.8 In Hans, the
Court extended the Eleventh Amendment to suits brought against a
state by one of its own citizens. The majority opinion, by Justice Bradley, was based entirely on an Anti-Reconstruction, Anti-Federalist vision, rather than an honest assessment of the history of Article III and
the Eleventh Amendment. The result in Hans was predictable because that case was decided by a Court that had already struck down
Reconstruction legislation to protect "states' sovereignty" and brought
harm to minority race persons. For the same reasons, the results in
the June 23, 1999 cases were predictable. These cases, like Hans, are
merely echoes of the Anti-Reconstruction sentiments prevalent on the
Court. Ah, you say, the June 23 cases concerning federal court jurisdiction and the sovereign immunity of states did not involve cases having to do with racial discrimination. Neither did Hans.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden v. Maine states that
the ruling is not based on the Eleventh Amendment. Nevertheless,
Justice Kennedy places more reliance on Hans v. Louisiana than on
the historical data regarding Article I or the Tenth Amendment. Like
Justice Bradley in Hans, Kennedy cites FederalistNo. 81, but not Federalist No. 80, when talking about the views of Hamilton. Kennedy selectively quotes Madison and Marshall in precisely the same ways as
Justice Bradley used their views in Hans. Ultimately, Justice Kennedy's
opinion is based on nothing but the Gang of Five's view of how the
federal system should work. Justice Souter's dissent is clearly correct,
despite Kennedy's protestations to the contrary, when he describes
the majority opinion as being based on philosophy that has no clear
basis in the text of the Constitution or documented intentions of the
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution or the amendments thereto. 9
IfJustice Souter were less kind, he would have called Kennedy's opinion tautology. Kennedy, like Bradley before him, finds that Congress
was not given the power to make states subject to suit because states
could not be subject to suit. Circular reasoning? You bet. But it's
good enough for government work, if five Justices agree.
The two cases concerning the dispute between the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board and the College Savings
Bank demonstrate the current majority's view of the power given to
Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Scalia, in College Savings Bank, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, in FloridaPrepaidPostsecondary
8 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
9 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269 (Souter, J.,joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer,
JJ., dissenting).
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Education Expense Board, used the Court's 1997 decision in Boerne v.
Flores'0 as the justification for the Court narrowly defining the scope of
power granted to Congress by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. No analysis of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment was
needed according to Rehnquist and Scalia; Scalia did not have to go
on one of his searches for original intent. Boerne settled all that, we
are told.
The fact that Congress concluded that it was protecting civil liberties under its Fourteenth Amendment power carries little weight with
the Gang of Five. Fourteenth Amendment legislation, according to
the majority opinions in College Savings Bank and FloridaPrepaidPostsecondary Education Expense Board, will be upheld only if the federal
government can prove to the satisfaction of the Gang of Five (1) that
there has been a constitutional violation, as defined by the Court
rather than Congress, and (2) that the legislation are narrowly tailored to remedy the violation or to prevent future similar constitutional violations.
In the two College Savings cases, the majority opinions, by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia respectively, did not explore the
historical basis for finding that the Court should place narrow limits
on the power granted to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rather, they simply relied upon the analysis of history and the Court's
ruling in Boerne v. Flores. Both the Scalia and Rehnquist opinions find
that the judiciary must independently determine the existence of a
constitutional violation and whether the means chosen by Congress to
remedy or correct the violation are narrowly tailored to that goal. Justice Scalia's opinion ruled that there was no deprivation of property in
the actions of Florida when it violated federal law in a way that
harmed the business prospects of the College Savings Bank." Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion ruled that, even if the Court were to assume that patent infringement constituted the taking of property,
Congress had failed to provide a legislative record showing that the
property was taken in violation of just Compensation Clause principles or that the congressional creation of a cause of action against
state governments for patent infringement was narrowly tailored to
correct unconstitutional takings of property.' 2 These two majority
opinions take Boerne to its logical, if unfortunate for the country, conclusion. Congress is to be given no deference in defining the types of
civil liberties that it will protect under the Fourteenth Amendment;
10 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
11 See College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224-26.
12

See FloridaPrepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2205-11.
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Congress will be given no deference when the Court looks at legislation that is designed to prevent specific constitutional violations.
Justice Stevens's dissent in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Expense
Board notes that the Court's reading of Boerne "threatens to read Congress's power to pass prophylactic legislation out of Section 5 altogether."1 3 While joining Justice Breyer's dissent in College Savings
Bank, Stevens again emphasized his view that the Court was unduly
restricting the Section 5 powers of Congress. 14 Justice Breyer's dissent
for four Justices in College Savings Bank asserted that Congress had the
power under the Commerce Clause to remove state immunity from
federal court actions. Justice Breyer attacked the majority's rigid view
of our federal system. 15
The views of the Rehnquist Court majority concerning the scope
of Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment should be
considered shocking, though not surprising. These opinions were
foreshadowed by a decade of rulings adverse to the interests of racial
minorities. Perhaps we should not even be shocked by a Supreme
Court that wants to cut down congressional protection for civil rights
because we have seen a Court like this before, in the late nineteenth
century.
In this Essay, I would like to compare some of the rulings of the
Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century with the rulings of the
Court since the appointment of Justice Kennedy to show that we are
witnessing the return of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court.
Before getting to a comparison of the Court in the 1990s and the
Court in the late nineteenth century, I need to digress into commentary on the labels that describe the players in today's federalism game
and the history that today's "Federalist" Justices don't like to talk
about.
III. You

CAN'T TELL THE

PLAYERS WITHOUT

A SCORECARD:

FEDERALIST, ANTI-FEDERALIST, OR PLAIN OLD
"STATES' RIGHTS" JUSTICES?

To understand the current dispute, you need to go back not one,
but two centuries. In the 1780s and 1790s, everyone knew who the

Federalists and the Anti-Federalists were. During the debates concerning the ratification of the proposed Constitution, a Federalist was
someone who favored adoption of the Constitution; an Anti-Federalist
13 Id. at 2217 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
14 See College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2234 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15 See id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, 1J.,
dissenting).
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was someone who opposed ratification. 16 After the Constitution was
ratified, however, a person was not a Federalist because he agreed
with, or even wrote some of, the FederalistPapers. A Federalist was a
member of the Federalist political party, whose leaders includedJohn
Adams, Alexander Hamilton, and John Marshall. Members of the
Federalist Party believed in a strong national government; they were
not champions of "states' rights."
The Federalists were opposed by a political party known as the
Democratic-Republicans (which was also called the Democrats, the
Republicans, or the Anti-Federalists in various portions of the country). The Anti-Federalists, who had opposed the Constitution, were a
dying political group. The Democratic-Republicans espoused a modified version of the Anti-Federalist philosophy; they mirrored the AntiFederalists in their opposition to the Federalists' political philosophy.' 7 The Democratic-Republicans, including Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison, favored a system in which state governments had
more power than the federal government. The Anti-Federalists, Democratic-Republicans, and Federalists disagreed over foreign as well as
domestic matters. The Federalists, for a time, supported the British in
their conflicts with the French. The Democratic-Republicans supported the French Revolution and opposed many policies of the British government.
The clear differences between the two dominant political groups
in the late nineteenth century made it easy to identify the politics of
newspapers of the time. Thus, The Gazette of the United States was considered the "mouthpiece of the Federalist Party," while The National
Gazette and The PhiladelphiaGeneralAdvertiser were seen as newspapers
8
supporting Anti-Federalist views.'
Why do people call themselves Federalists today when they are in
fact espousing views of the Democratic-Republicans and Anti-Federalists? Perhaps they do not want to be seen as rejecting the views of
ChiefJustice Marshall. Perhaps these persons do not want to be given
the label of "states' rights" advocates; they want to separate themselves
from the states' rights positions taken by southern politicians from the
16 Everyone knows about the Federalists. If you don't, you should check the footnotes in Nowak, supra note 2. For information about the Anti-Federalists and their
opposition to the Constitution, see generally THE ANTFEDERAUSTS (Cecilia M. Kenyon
ed., 1966), and THE CoMPLETE Ai'lr-FEDER
(Herbert Strong ed., 1981).
17 Regarding the disputes between these groups, see Nowak, supra note 2. See
generallyJOsEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONsrrrUrboN: THE EARLST DEBATES
OvER ORIGINAL INTENT (1999).
18 EDWIN EmMRy, THE PRESS AND AMERucA, AN IhnRPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE MASS
MEDIA

105 (3d ed. 1972).
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Civil War era to the 1960s. All of today's Justices, and most law professors, are well aware that the campaign for states' rights was a campaign
of Southern state and local governments for the powers to disregard
federal law and Supreme Court rulings concerning racial discrimination. One assumes that Southern politicians in the 1950s and 1960s
longed to have a Supreme Court like the one that existed in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their ideal Court would restrict federal power to protect civil rights and do nothing on its own to
help minority race persons. Today's Federalists pretend that those
Southern politicians have not had their wish fulfilled.
Chief Justice Marshall, a real Federalist, rejected the argument
that the states, rather than the people themselves, created the federal
government. He saw the Constitution as being based on the will of
the people as a whole. Our federal system, without the intervention of
the judiciary, works in a way that is consistent with the views of Chief
Justice Marshall. As Herbert Wechsler and Jesse Choper have so ably
shown, federal legislation will virtually never cause significant harm to
a majority of state governments for the simple reason that such harmful legislation could not be passed by Congress. 19 Regardless of which
political party has a majority in the House or Senate, and regardless of
the political affiliation of the President, governors and other representatives of state governments will have their voices heard in the federal legislative process. The same people who elect members of the
House and Senate also elect governors and state legislators. Congresspersons who "beat up" state and local governments, in contravention
of the will of the people, are not headed for long careers in Congress.
Though they may claim theoretical kinship with the Federalists,
the Gang of Five cannot disguise the fact that they have nothing but
disdain for the federal system that our country adopted both in 1787
and following the Civil War. These states' rightsJustices want to give a
state that disagrees with a federal law, passed with the approval of a
majority of people in the country, the ability to disregard that federal
law. Given that the Supremacy Clause of Article VI requires states to
follow federal law, that is not an easy position to justify. The only "re19

See JESSE H.

CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLTICAL PROCESS

(1980); Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
See generallyJohn E. Nowak, Book Review, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1223 (1980) (reviewing

supra).
A number of professors have disputed Professor Wechsler's and Professor
Choper's view of the federal system. Since these scholars are wrong, I am not going to
cite them. I'll bet that you can find citations to those persons in other papers in this
Symposium.
CHOPER,
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spectable" way to be a champion of an Anti-Reconstruction states'
fights position (in the 1950s sense) and an Anti-Federalist position
(rejecting everything thatJohn Marshall stood for) is to find that Congress was never given the authority to govern state activities in a variety
of areas. Of course, to fully carry out the Anti-Reconstruction, AntiFederalist "vision," a court would have to restrict the scope of the federal commerce power, give a narrow interpretation to the enforcement clauses of the Civil War amendments, interpret federal civil
rights legislation in the narrowest possible manner, restrict both state
and federal legislation that helped racial minorities, restrict the power
of federal courts to cure racial segregation in schools, and, oh yes,
grant state governments immunity from lawsuits based on federal
statutes.
IV.

FORGET HISTORY-THE SUPREME COURT HAS!

A.

Article IlI & the Eleventh Amendment

In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,20 the Supreme Court majority refers to
the history of Article HII and the Eleventh Amendment in a way that
makes it appear that the drafters and ratifiers of that Article and
Amendment clearly meant to prohibit congressional power to create
causes of action against state governments when it used its Article I
powers. That conclusion provides much of the basis for the majority
opinion in Alden. Nevertheless, that conclusion is, at best, highly debatable if one looks at more history than is supplied by the Gang of
Five's opinions.
There is no clear documentary authority for the proposition that
Article HI was intended, by drafters or ratifiers, to preclude congressional creation of federal causes of action against state governments.
The records of the Constitutional Convention contain no clear references to the Committee of Detail's proposal for establishing federal
judicial jurisdiction over cases "between a State and Citizens of another State." 2 1 The ratification debates are ambiguous, at best. For
example, in the Virginia ratification debates, Edmund Randolph and
James Wilson (both of whom were members of the Committee of Detail) indicated that the proposed Constitution would allow federal lawsuits against state governments.2 2 Opponents of the Constitution in
20 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
21 See Nowak, supranote 2, at 1423-25, for reference to the records of the Convention and the notes of the Committee of Detail.
22 One author, at the start of the 20th century, asserted thatJames Wilson drafted
the Article III language concerning jurisdiction over suits against states. See Allen
Caperton Braxton, The Eleventh Amendment, Address Before The Virginia State Bar
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Virginia understood Article III to allow such suits and made that point
in opposition to ratification. Madison and Marshall asserted that Article III did not create federal court jurisdiction for suits against states,
but they were silent on the point of whether Congress would be able
23
to create federal causes of action against state governments.
The Hans and Alden majority opinions refer to FederalistNo. 81, in
which Alexander Hamilton states,
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent...

[T] here is no color to

pretend that the State governments would, by the adoption of that
plan [the Constitution], be divested of the privilege of paying their
own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that
24
which flows from the obligations of good faith.
However, in FederalistNo. 81, Hamilton made no reference to whether
Congress could create federal court jurisdiction to allow suits against
state governments. All of the reasons he expresses in FederalistNo. 81
for arguing against inherent jurisdiction over debt cases against state
governments would not apply to the issue of whether Congress could
create a regulation enforceable against state governments through
court actions. Unfortunately, in the Supreme Court's majority opinions, there is no analysis of FederalistNo. 80, in which Hamilton suggested that states could be sued by citizens of other states. Federalist
Nos. 80 and 81 would be entirely consistent if Hamilton meant to say
that federal courts could not assume jurisdiction over state governments unless Congress (with presidential approval or by overriding a
presidential veto) regulated states pursuant to one of its Article I powers and then gave citizens a right to enforce those regulations through
court actions. Indeed, in closing his argument concerning the national judicial power, Hamilton noted that congressional control of
jurisdiction would prevent problems because Congress would be responsive to the will of a majority of states.
The Seminole Tribe and Alden majority opinions take the position
that the Eleventh Amendment was designed to reverse Chisholm v.
Georgia2?5 in a way that meant that Congress could not create federal
causes of action for money damages against state governments. The
analysis of Chisholm, in these opinions, consists of assertions rather
Association (July 30-31, 1907), in

REPORT OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR AssoCIATION 172 (John B. Minor ed., 1907).

23

See Nowak, supra note 2, at 1426-27.
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).

24 THE

25 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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than historical data. These opinions provide no insight into the disputes between the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans (and
Anti-Federalists) that were part of the history of the Eleventh
Amendment.
Chisholm was decided by Federalist Justices, one of whom was
James Wilson. In that case, the Supreme Court entertained an action
to enforce a debt of a state government without any specific federal
legislation creating such federal court jurisdiction. The states felt
threatened by the opinion, as a number of states had incurred significant debts during the Revolutionary War. Many of the creditors with
claims against state governments were Tories. Not surprisingly, immediate reaction to Chisholm ran along party lines. Many Federalists and
Federalist newspapers indicated agreement with the Court's position;
the Democratic-Republicans (the Anti-Federalists) attacked the case
immediately.
Federalists soon came to oppose Chisholm for reasons that are debated among scholars. Professor Jacobs believed that the Federalists
supported the Eleventh Amendment for theoretical reasons after they
considered the scope of power it would give to the federal judiciary. 26
On the other hand, I concluded that the switch in position by the
Federalist members of Congress related to more mundane political
concerns. 27 At the same time that the Eleventh Amendment was being considered, there was a real possibility of war with Great Britain.
The Senate vote for the Amendment occurred shortly after the Portuguese-Algerian Pirate Truce, induced and coordinated by Britain,
which seemed to threaten our naval interests. The House of Representatives vote on the Eleventh Amendment took place only a week
after it was announced in Philadelphia that the British were seizing
American ships in the West Indies. A vote against the Eleventh
Amendment would have been viewed by the public as a vote for the
rights of Tory creditors. A vote for the Eleventh Amendment, on the
other hand, coincided with the Federalist Party's strategy of proving
that they were as anti-British as the Democratic-Republicans.
The true intent of the Eleventh Amendment framers may be lost
to history, for, among other reasons, there were a number of members of each house of Congress who did not have any affiliation with
either the Federalists or Democratic-Republicans. However, the views
of the Federalists who voted for the Eleventh Amendment seem to be
clear. They were voting only to stop the federal courts from assuming
26

See CLYDE E.

JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AmENDMT AND SOVEREIGN ImmUN=IY

(1972).
27 See Nowak, supra note 2, at 1437-41.
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jurisdiction over debt actions without congressional authorization.
There is no reason to believe that the Federalists sought to restrict the
scope of federal legislative authority. Most, though not all, of the
scholars who have looked at the Eleventh Amendment history in the
past quarter-century have, for a variety of reasons, concluded that the
Amendment left Congress with a great scope of power to create causes
of actions against state governments in the federal courts. All of that
history was disregarded by the Gang of Five's majority opinions in Seminole Tbe and Alden.
B.

The Fourteenth Amendment

Recognition of the complete disagreement between President
Johnson and members of Congress (who impeached Johnson and almost removed him from office) concerning the scope of congressional power and the relationship of the federal government to the
states is essential to understanding the Fourteenth Amendment.2 8 After the Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified, Congress passed a
Civil Rights Act,2 9 over the veto of President Johnson, who did not

believe that the Thirteenth Amendment Enabling Clause gave Congress the power to protect civil rights. The Congress also passed,
again over President Johnson's veto, the Second Freedman's Bureau
Law to protect persons who were deprived of civil rights in the South8 0
ern states.
28 A reader interested in the history of the 14th Amendment's adoption might
want to refer to the following works: HORACE E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF Tm FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908), JOSEPH C. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1956), WiLIA E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM PoLrrICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988),JACOBUs TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW

(1965), and Benjamin B. Kendrick, TheJournalof the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, in 62 STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 1 (Faculty of Political
Science of Columbia University eds., 1914). The history of the Amendment is also
summarized in relation to two more particular legal inquiries in Alexander M. Bickel,
The Original Understandingand the SegregationDecision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1955), and
Charles Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmendment Incorporatethe Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L.

REv. 5 (1949).
29

Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. This law was passed by overriding

Johnson's veto. See
and House).

CONG. GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1809, 1861 (1866) (Senate

30 Act ofJuly 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173. There was an earlier bill to continue
the Freedman Bureau which was passed by Congress but vetoed by PresidentJohnson.

The attempt to override the veto in the Senate failed at that time. See CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 943 (1866). However, a second bill was reintroduced on this
subject which also included a section establishing jurisdiction in military courts to

protect the rights of freedmen in the South. This bill was passed over the veto of
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In Boerne v. Nores,3 ' the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, found that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
give Congress the power to expand the scope of civil liberties that the
Court defined under Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
section llI.A.i of his opinion in Boerne (which was joined by an uncertain number ofJustices) ,32 justice Kennedy found that the opposition
to Representative John Bingham's initial proposal for an amendment
framed only in terms of congressional power, and the tabling of that
proposal, proved that the majority of Congress that ultimately voted
for the proposed Amendment denied Congress the power to expand
civil liberties.
The attacks on Bingham's first proposal were framed in terms of
congressional power because the proposal was framed in terms of congressional power. After the Joint Committee returned its draft
(which, after some compromise between the House and Senate, became the proposed and ratified Fourteenth Amendment), opponents
of the proposed Amendment attacked the entire Amendment on the
basis that it supplanted state and local law. Indeed, comments were
made in opposition to the proposed Fourteenth Amendment because
it "constitutionalized" Congress's passage of the Civil Rights Bill. 33
There can be no honest doubt that the Thirty-Ninth Congress
proposed an Amendment that would have constitutionalized the Civil
President Johnson. See id. at 3842. The provision for military jurisdiction was contained in section 14 of that bill.
31 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
32 Justice Scalia voted for the Court's interpretation of the 14th Amendment but

he would not sign-on to Kennedy's description of the original intent of the framers
and ratifiers of the 14th Amendment. See id. at 507 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens concurred in Boerne because he thought the Religious Freedom Restoration

Act violated the religion clauses of the FirstAmendment. His position concerning the
scope of congressional power under the 14th Amendment was unclear. See id. at
536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Souter believed that the Boerne case should

have been dismissed without a ruling on the merits of the case. See id. at 565 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, in Boerne, did not wish to address the question of
whether the 14th Amendment justified the legislation. See id. at 544 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
In the June 23, 1999 decisions, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
disputed the Gang of Five's interpretation of Boerne. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2213-19 (1999) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
33 For the comments of those who were in opposition to the Amendment because
it "constitutionalized" the Civil Rights Bill, see, for example, CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2461 (1866) (statement of Rep. Finck), id. at 2506 (statement of Rep.
Eldridge), id. at 2538 (statement of Rep. Rogers), and id. at 2512-13 (exchange between Reps. Raymond and Wilson).
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Rights Act and displaced a great amount of state authority that existed
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment. Persons attacking the proposed
Fourteenth Amendment, after it came out of Congress, focused on
the scope of congressional power as well as judicial power to displace
federal laws. The Johnson Administration did not sit on the sideline
during the ratification process. Secretary of the Interior Browning
wrote a lengthy letter to newspapers that probably had been approved
by President Johnson.3 4 In that letter, Browning attacked the power
given to each branch of the federal government to displace independence of the states. However, a number of newspaper articles in the
North endorsed the creation of a federal legislative power to protect
certain natural law rights. 35

Browning's argument was rejected in

some of the leading northern newspapers. As the New York Herald
stated,
[T] he great fear of Mr. Browning is that this Amendment in its operation will do away with state sovereignty, legislative and judicial,
and will put legislatures and courts of several states under Congress
and the federal courts.... We hold that this old Southern theory of
our government was demolished at Petersburg and surrendered at
Appomattox Court House with Lee's army; and so we dismiss this
36
branch of the argument.
Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed sweeping legislation displacing state authority. The

Boerne majority opinion cites Representative Garfield as arguing during the debate on the Ku Klux Klan Act that there were limits on
congressional power over the states. 3 7 Justice Kennedy's opinion does
not focus on the fact that the Ku Klux Klan Act was passed despite
dissenter's concerns about the scope of federal power.3 8 Indeed, supporters of the Civil Rights Bill of 1871 saw it as only the first step in
34 The letter appeared in The Cincinnati Commercial, among other papers. See
Browning Letter, CINCINNATI COM., Oct. 26, 1866, at 2. See Nowak, supra note 2, at
1457-58, for a reprint of the Browning letter.

35

See Fairman, supranote 28, at 68-81; Daniel A. Farber &John E. Muench, The

Ideological Origins of the FourteenthAmendment, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 235 (1984).
36 The ConstitutionalAmendment-A Cabinet Lauyer's Objections, N.Y. HERALD, Oct.
25, 1866, at 6. Similar sentiments can be found in TENBROEK, supra note 28, at

219-20, The Browning Letter: Comments of the New York Press, CINCINNATI COM., Oct. 26,
1866, at 1, and Secretary Browning's Letter-The Presidentand the Amendment, N.Y. TIMES,

Oct. 25, 1866, at 4.
37 See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523 (1999).
38 The statute included authority for the federal government to use force to enforce the civil rights protected by the statute and, under certain circumstances, to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. SeeAct of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, §§ 2-6, 217 Stat.
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enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment principles. For example,
Representative Coburn stated his belief that Congress had the power
under the Fourteenth Amendment to literally set aside state governments and take over the functions of the state.3 9 It would be surprising if a majority of the Republicans who ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment, many of whom could be described as Abolitionists or
Radical Republicans, did not see themselves as having such power.
When Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment failed to spur
Southern states to grant black persons the right to vote, there was
enough Reconstruction sentiment left in the North for ratification of
the Fifteenth Amendment, guaranteeing a right to vote for all persons
(at least men) regardless of race and granting Congress the power to
take steps to enforce that right in states that were failing to allow minority race persons to vote.
Unfortunately, the Reconstruction spirit of the North did not last.
By the end of the century, the Congress would repeal some of the civil
40
rights legislation that had been passed in the Reconstruction era.
The Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court of the late nineteenth century had already overturned some of the Reconstruction era civil
rights legislation and had so narrowly interpreted other civil rights
statutes that they were made meaningless.
V. Ti-m FIRST ANTI-RECONSTRUCrION COURT
Every law student knows that the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries invalidated the most blatant
forms of racial classifications that harmed minority race persons. Law
professors are 'Judge lovers"; they like to portray the Supreme Court
Justices as the good guys. It is a rare class in which the students learn
enough of the Court's history to realize that the question of whether
Marbuy v. Madison4 1 has helped or hurt racial minorities is impossible
to answer with certainty.
In every constitutional law course, students learn that the Court
invalidated a state statute that openly excluded black persons from
juries. 42 How many courses, I wonder, examine the Court's refusal, in
Virginia v. Rives,4 3 to invalidate the conviction of a black defendant
who had been tried before an all white jury? How many students real39 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1871) (Statement of Rep. Coburn).
40 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36.
41 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137 (1803).
42 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
43 100 U.S. 313 (1879); see also Benno Schmidt, Juries,Jurisdictionand RaceDiscrimination: The Last Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEx. L. REv. 1401 (1983).
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ize the similarity of then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Batson v. Kentucky" to the Court's ruling in Rives?
Every student knows that the Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins45 ruled
that a city ordinance regulating laundries violated the Equal Protection Clause insofar as it was used in a selective manner to exclude
Asian-American persons from owning laundries. Judging by
casebooks, most students do not get to study the Court rulings from
this era finding that states had a special public interest in limiting land
ownership and certain businesses to U.S. citizens, which allowed the
West Coast states to effectively create racial barriers against AsianAmericans owning property or engaging in certain types of
46
businesses.
All but the most blatant forms of open discrimination by law were
upheld by the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Court struck down a law prohibiting minority race
persons from owning housing in a certain area of town, though the
basis for that ruling was unclear.4 7 But the Court upheld statutes punishing sexual activity between members of different races. 4 8 While
pretending to create a separate but equal doctrine, the Court upheld
the provision of education to white students only when a local school
board claimed that it could not afford to operate a high school for
black students as well as white students. 49 And the Court upheld fines
imposed on a private college for teaching black and white students
50
together.
Perhaps one could not have expected a court to try to lead the
country in a move for racial equality or integration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But we might have expected a
court that would not prevent congressional protection of minority
race persons. However, our expectations would not have been met.
The Court interpreted the scope of power given to Congress by the
Civil War Amendments so as to prevent Congress from preventing violence against, and exploitation of, African-Americans.
The Court would recognize a limited power of the federal government to protect minority race persons when they were actually in the
44

476 U.S. 79, 134 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

45

118 U.S. 356 (1886).
See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA

46

& JOHN E. NOWAK, 3 TREAIsE ON CONSTITUTIONAL

47

18.12(b), at 472-75 (3d ed. 1999).
See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).

48

See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882).

49

See Cumming v. Board of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).

50

See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
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custody of a United States Marshall. 5 1 However, the Court held in
United States v. Cruikshank5 2 that Congress had no constitutional authority given to it by the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments to
punish assault or murder of minority race persons by private individuals. It made this ruling even though more than one hundred African53
Americans had been murdered in a public place.
Although the Court ruled that Congress had the power to protect
individuals from being harmed when they were actually voting in federal elections, 54 the Court ruled that Congress had no authority under
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendments to punish persons who engage in a conspiracy to prevent minority race persons
from voting.5 5 The Court found that the Civil War Amendments did
not give the federal government the ability to punish conspiracies that
were designed to prevent the government from providing protection
56
to racial minority persons.
Some of the Court's best known rulings restricting the authority
of the federal government in the late nineteenth century read like bad
philosophy papers rather than court rulings based on history or legal
precedent. In the Civil Rights Cases,5 7 the Supreme Court held that
Congress could not outlaw any form of race discrimination or any
deprivation of civil liberties under its Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment powers that would not have been invalidated by Section
1 of these Amendments. The Supreme Court, in the CivilRights Cases,
found that Congress had no power to act against private persons who
sought to deprive minority race individuals of equal access to public
facilities. The Court said that the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment requested by the executive branch could not be allowed
because giving that interpretation to the Fourteenth Amendment
would conflict with the structure of the federal system that was embodied in the Tenth Amendment. The Court did not exactly invalidate
the Fourteenth Amendment legislation on the basis of the Tenth
Amendment, but it came pretty close. 58 It used the Tenth Amendment to interpret both the applicability of Section I of the Fourteenth
51 See Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
52 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
53 For an account of the violence that was the background for this litigation, see
Brooks D. Simpson, This Bloody and Monstrous Crim, CONST., Fall 1992, at 38.
54 SeeExparteYarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
55 See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
56 See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
57 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
58 See id. at 15.
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Amendment to private action and the scope of power given to Congress by Section 5 of the Amendment.
I could not demonstrate that these Supreme Court rulings directly contributed to the killing of thousands of black persons. Nevertheless, the rulings of the Court prevented the federal government, if
federal administrators had been so inclined, from attempting to stop
the killing of minority race persons throughout this country. There
were thousands of lynchings of minority persons that might have been
prevented by the federal government. 59 There was no federal protection for the black persons who were killed and who had their neighborhood destroyed in Tulsa, Oklahoma or for the black persons who
60
were killed when Rosewood, Florida was destroyed by a white mob.
The Supreme Court bears some responsibility for those murders because it blocked congressional and executive branch actions designed
to protect racial minorities.
Hans v. Louisianareads much like the Civil Rights Cases. According to Hans, Article I and the Eleventh Amendment did not give
power to Congress to create private courses of action against states
because such an interpretation of the Constitution would conflict with
the Justices' views of a federal system. Knowing how the cases had to
come out, the Court found it easy to analyze the issue in Hans in a way
that would restrict federal power. Justice Bradley's majority opinion
in Hans reflected the views of the Anti-Federalists, rather than the
views ofJohn Marshall. Bradley cited statements ofJohn Marshall that
might support the view that states could not be defendants in a federal
court action. But Bradley dismissed language in Chief Justice Mar59 There appear to have been, by a conservative estimate, almost 5000 lynchings
of racial minorities. The state-by-state lynching estimates contained in the Tuskegee
University Lynching Reports are quoted in Mark Mayfield & Tom Watson, Guilt, Innocence Blurwith Passage of Time, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 1992, at 2A. For an account of the
number of persons lynched, by race, from 1882 to 1970, see also U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO

(1976).
60 Information concerning the Tulsa race riot of 1921 was provided by Professor
Alfred L. Brophy, who has given the author of this Essay a draft of his article, based on
a report he wrote for the Oklahoma Legislature's Commission on the Tulsa Race Riot,
that is tentatively tided Reconstructing the Dreamland: Contemplating Civil Rights
Actions and Reparations for the Tulsa Riot of 1921 (1999) (on file with the author &
the Notre Dame Law Review). See also Jim Yardley, PanelRecommends Reparationsin LongIgnored Tulsa Race Riot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at 1.
THE PRESENT 422

The State of Florida has taken action to compensate the remaining survivors and
descendants of persons murdered in the 1923 "Rosewood Massacre." See Rosewood
Massacre-Investigation Compensation, 1994 FLA. LAWS ch. 94-359.
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shall's opinion in Cohens v. Virginia6 l indicating that both Article HI
and the Eleventh Amendment only precluded suits against state governments by a citizen of another state and did not preclude suits by
citizens of the state. Justice Bradley found that Chief Justice Marshall's statement was "unnecessary to the decision, and in that sense
extra-judicia and though made by one who seldom used words without due reflection, ought not to outweigh the important considerations referred to which lead to a different conclusion [than Chief
Justice Marshall's view of the structure of the federal system and the
Eleventh Amendment]. 62 In the next decade, the Court in Ex parte
Young 63 would provide an avenue by which citizens could force state
officers to conform state actions to federal law. However, since the
Court was controlling the scope of permissible congressional action, it
was protecting states from federal authority except in a few narrow
areas.
VI.

TiE ARRIVAL

OF ANTHONY KENNEDY

&

THE SECOND

ANTI-RECONSTRUCTION COURT

Early in the Burger Court era, it appeared that all of the Anti64
Reconstruction views of the earlier Courts had been repudiated.
The Court was giving great deference to congressional determinations
concerning the scope of the Commerce Clause so that Congress could
use that clause to protect the interest of minority race persons if it so
chose. 65 The Court overruled the earlier cases limiting the scope of
Congress's Thirteenth Amendment power. In 1968 and 1976, the
Court restored the original understanding of some Reconstruction
era civil rights laws. 6 6 The Court ruled that Congress had the power
61

19 U.S. (IWheat.) 264 (1821).

62 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890).
63 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
64 For an examination of the change in the Court's position toward protection of
the interest of racial minorities, see MARm V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW:
THURCOOD MARsHALL AND THE SuPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994) [hereinafter
TusHN~m, MAING Cwvm RIGHTS LAw], MA V. TusHNm, TnE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGANST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,

1925-1950 (1987) [hereinafter

TUSHNET, THE

NAACP], and see also DEmuC BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMF.scUAN LA.W §§ 1.1-.17,
7.1-.14 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing racism in the context of public schools), Derrick
Bell, Law, Litigation, and the Searchfor the Promised Land, 76 GEo.LJ. 229 (1987) (re-

viewing TUSHNEr, THE NAACP, supra), and Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation:Decisionmakingin the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. LJ. 1 (1979).

65 See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
66 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968).
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to enact legislation penalizing private persons, as well as government
actors, for preventing persons from exercising basic civil rights, such
as the right to travel. 6 7 The Burger Court, though without a majority
opinion, upheld federal preference for the awarding of public works
68
contracts to businesses owned by minority race persons.
The Court did not approve congressional action lowering the voting age for state or local elections to eighteen without a constitutional
amendment. 69 But the Court granted great deference to Congress in
controlling actions of state governments and private persons related
to racial discrimination in voting. The Court allowed the prohibition
of literacy tests by Congress even though the Court had found that
70
such tests did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.
It upheld the requirement that states that had a low percentage of
registered voters among their racial minority populations could not
change any voting laws without the approval of the Justice Department or the District Court in the District of Columbia. The Court,
without a majority opinion, allowed jurisdictions covered by section 5
of the Voting Rights Act to employ race conscious districting in order
71
to protect the voting strength of minority racial groups.
The Justices also used the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the implied equal protection of the Fifth
Amendment to protect racial minorities. The Warren Court repudiated the separate but equal doctrine. 7 2 The early years of the Burger
Court saw the Justices endorsing a wide power of federal courts to
fashion remedies that would undo the effects of past racial segrega73
tion in school systems.
The Court's position on most of these issues began to change
slowly between the late 1970s and 1989.74 Nevertheless, we can point
to one event that marks the end of an era in which the Supreme Court
was interested in the protection of racial minorities and the start of an
era in which the Supreme Court would consistently rule against the
interests of minority race persons. That event was the appointment of
67 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
68 See Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
69 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
70 See id. at 112; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 544 (1969).
71 See United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
72 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 3 ROTUNDA & NowAY, supra
note 46, § 18.8.
73 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); 3 RoTUNDA & NowAm, supra note 46, § 18.9.
74 For an analysis of the shift in the Court's rulings, see John E. Nowak, The Rise
and Fall of Supreme Court Concern for Racial Minorities, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 345

(1995).
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Anthony Kennedy to the Supreme Court. With the exception of one
case concerning federal racial "affirmative action" programs, which

would be reversed a few years later, and some very limited rulings concerning the technical application of the Voting Rights Act, since
Anthony Kennedy joined the Court, a majority of Justices have voted
against the interests of racial minorities in every case. Justice Kennedy
would join ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustites O'Connor, Scalia, and
White (and later, Justice Thomas) to form a Gang of Five that would
consistently vote against the interests of racial minorities.
We could have anticipated the Court's actions during the past ten
years by looking at the Spring of 1989. Justice Kennedy was appointed
to the Court in February of 1988; his first full term on the Court was
the October 1988 Term. In the Spring of 1989, Justice Kennedy
voted: to use strict scrutiny to eliminate virtually all forms of state or
local affirmative action for racial minorities; 75 to make it difficult for
minority workers in low-paying jobs to show that the predominance of
76
white workers in higher-payed positions violated federal law; to increase the ability of white persons to challenge private sector affirmative action programs; 77 for an interpretation of Title VII that made it
difficult for women workers to challenge a seniority system that was
alleged to have a discriminatory purpose; 78 and for the position that
cities could not be held liable for employee violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 under a respondeat superior theory.7 9 He wrote a majority
opinion drastically restricting the scope of a Thirteenth Amendment
Reconstruction era civil rights statute.8 0 The Civil Rights Act of 199181
75 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
76 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Atonio has been
superseded by federal statute. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
77 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). Martin has been superseded by federal statute. SeeThe Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. at 1071. For a discussion of the
bar against collateral attacks of consent decrees, see Susan S. Grover, The Silenced Majoiity: Martin v. Wilks and the Legislative Response, 1992 U. ItL. L. REv. 43.
78 See Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989). Lorance has been superseded by federal statute. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. at 1071.
79 SeeJett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
80 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). Pattersonhas been
superseded by federal statute. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. at 1071.
81 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. at 1071, was adopted after President
Bush had vetoed legislation that was in many ways similar to the final act.
For analysis of the interaction of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the President regarding the creation of civil rights, see Symposium, CivilRights Legislationin the
1990s, 79 CAL. L. REV. 591 (1991), and Stephen F. Ross, LegislativeEnforcement of Equal
Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311 (1987).
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was adopted in part to reverse, insofar as possible, some of these
Spring, 1989 decisions.
Perhaps because ofJustice Kennedy's votes in cases involving minority race persons, David Souter was questioned closely regarding
protection of racial minorities in his confirmation hearing. Although
then-Judge Souter would not answer specific questions as to his position on constitutional issues, he gave answers to Senators' questions
indicating that he supported the goals of the Voting Rights Act and
that he believed that Congress had the power to use benign racial
classifications to remedy harms caused to racial minorities by societal
discrimination. 8 2 Justice Souter's voting pattern has demonstrated
that he did not mislead the Senators.
As late as 1990, there was a majority of Justices on the Supreme
Court who believed that Congress could authorize racial affirmative
action programs if those programs were truly benign in character and
were tailored to promote important interests. In Metro Broadcastingv.
F. C.C.,83 Justice Stevens and Justice White took the position that Con-

gress had the authority to use racial classifications in a benign manner, even though they believed that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment prevented state and local governments from engaging in
84
a similar use of racial classifications.
After Justice White left the Court, Justice Thomas joined the four
dissenting Justices from Metro Broadcastingto overrule that decision.
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,85 Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas ruled that Congress
had no greater authority to use benign racial classifications than did
state or local governments. The Gang of Five effectively ended the
authority of the federal government to help racial minorities. The
Justices had already ruled in 1989 that state and local governments
could only employ a racial classification to help minority race persons
if the racial classification was narrowly tailored to correct identified
86
illegal or unconstitutional discrimination.
82 The hearings concerning the nomination of David H. Souter to be an Associate Justice are documented in Nomination of David H. Souter to be AssociateJustice of the

Supreme Court of the United States: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. (1991), repinted in 16 THE SUPREME COURT OF =a UIrED STATES: HEARINGS
AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURTJUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1990, at 123, 202-10, 256-57, 263,
276-77, 316-18, 364-65, 374-75, 385, 429, 460-63 (Roy M. Mersky et al. eds., 1992).
83 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
84 See id. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
86 See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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The Burger Court had not been sympathetic to claims of minority
race persons who alleged that legislative districts had been established
for the purpose of reducing their ability to elect representatives to a
legislative body. According to the Burger Court, mere dilution of the
voting power of racial minorities would not be enough to establish a
racial classification.8 7 In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights
Act to provide greater protection for minority race voters.8 8 In 1986,
the Court interpreted the 1982 Act in a way that only slightly eased the
burden of plaintiffs who challenged a voting law on the basis that the
law diluted the voting strength of minority race voters. To win a case
under the amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, minority race
plaintiffs would have to show that the minority race group was large
and geographically compact, so that the group would have constituted
a majority in a district drawn with no racially discriminatory purpose;
that minority race voters were so politically cohesive that they would
have control of an election in fairly drawn districts; and that white
voters were likely to engage in block voting.8 9 In 1993, the Supreme
Court ruled that minority race voters who allege that they were
packed into a single district so as to prevent them from influencing
the vote in more than one legislative district would have to meet all of
those conditions in order to show racial discrimination that would violate section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.90 When white voters, during
the 1990s, complained about the use of racial considerations to draw
legislative district lines, they would not have to overcome similar
hurdles.
The Court's rulings on the scope of Congress's Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment power to protect the interests of minority race
voters provide clear evidence of a desire on the part of five Justices to
return to a late nineteenth-century approach toward interpretation of
the Civil War Amendments. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires jurisdictions with a history of low registration of racial minority
voters to have changes in their voting systems approved by the Attorney General. The Gang of Five, in the 1990s, issued a series of rulings
that made it impossible for the Attorney General to order or even
encourage a state or local legislature to create legislative district lines
in a way that would strengthen minority race voting power.
87 See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). The Court found sufficient proof of
discriminatory purpose in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
88 Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (1982) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)
(1994)).
89 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
90 SeeVoinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993). See 3 ROTUNDA & NowA, supra
note 46, § 18.4, for references to additional Voting Rights Act cases.
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In Shaw v. Reno,9 1 the Court, by a five to four vote (surprise!),
held that North Carolina's creation of a legislative district with a majority of minority race voters constituted a racial classification that had
to be subject to the strict scrutiny test. When the case returned to the
Supreme Court, five Justices ruled that if the lines were drawn to alleviate the effect of societal discrimination in North Carolina, the creation of a minority race district would be invalid because it would not
92
be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest of the state.
As Justice Souter pointed out, the most amazing aspect of the
Shaw ruling is the fact that, even with the additional legislative district
in which minority race persons would be a majority of voters, minority
race persons would continue to be statistically under-represented in
the North Carolina congressional delegation. White voters did not
have to prove vote dilution or racial block voting to have legislative
districts invalidated by the Gang of Five.
In Miller v. Johnson,9 3 the Court ruled that the Voting Rights Act
would not be interpreted to give the Justice Department the right to
require states to create legislative districts to maximize the voting
power of minority race persons, at least so long as the Justice Department could not show that such a district was absolutely necessary to
remedy identified unconstitutional discriminatory acts designed to
suppress minority race voting power. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion stated that an interpretation of the Voting Rights Act that would
allow the federal government to maximize voting power of minority
94
race persons would create "constitutional problems."
The Miller decision involved the plan adopted by the Georgia
Legislature for the election of representatives to the United States
91 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
92 See Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899 (1996). The Shaw litigation returned
to the Supreme Court for a third time in 1999. In Hunt v. Cromartie,119 S. Ct. 1545
(1999), the Justices unanimously ruled that a district court should not have entered
summary judgment against the government in a case involving an allegation of race
conscious districting. The Justices simultaneously split five to four regarding their
assessment of the evidence that had been presented to the lower court. Justice
Thomas's majority opinion (for the Gang of Five) stated that the statistical and circumstantial evidence presented in the motions to the district court "tends to support
an inference" that the legislature had a predominantly racial motive when it adopted
the districting plan. Id. at 1546. Justice Stevens, writing for four Justices who concurred only in the judgment of the Court in Cromartie,indicated that the evidence
that had been presented to the district court demonstrated that the motivation of the
legislature was political, rather than racial. See id. at 1555 (Stevens, J.,joined by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, fJ., concurring in the judgment).
93 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
94 Id. at 927.
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House of Representatives. The original districting map drawn by the
Georgia legislature included two congressional districts that were
likely to be controlled by, and that would therefore likely elect, minority race persons. The United States Attorney General refused to approve the plan under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Instead of
challenging the Attorney General's decision, the Georgia legislature
adopted a plan with three congressional districts that would be controlled by minority race voters. White voters challenged the plan, and
the Supreme Court, in Miller, ruled that the final Georgia districting
plan, with three minority-race-controlled districts, violated the Equal
Protection Clause.
After remand in Miller, the district court adopted a congressional
district map for Georgia in which there was only one congressional
district wherein a majority of the voters would be minority race persons.9 5 The plan adopted by the district court gave less voting power
to minority race persons than the plan that had been originally
adopted by the Georgia legislature (prior to any action by the Attorney General). In Abrams v. Johnson,96 the Gang of Five upheld the
district court and ruled that the Georgia congressional district map
should have only one district in which minority race voters could control an election. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Abrams held
that the action of the Georgia legislature in adopting its original district map did not reflect the true intent of that legislative body. According to Justice Kennedy, the Georgia legislature would have
created a congressional district map where minority race persons
would be likely to control the election of only one congressional representative, were it not for fear of submitting the plan to the Department of Justice for approval under the Voting Rights Act 9 7
The Gang of Five may have a falling out regarding the Voting
Rights Act. In 1996, in Bush v. Vera,98 Justice O'Connor wrote an
opinion that was, in part, a majority opinion and, in part, a plurality
opinion. She wrote for five Justices in finding that a legislative district
designed to improve the voting power of minority race persons had to
be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. However, ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas would not join a concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor in which she stated that a state or
95 Johnson v. Miller, 929 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D. Ga. 1996).

96 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
97 The dissenters pointed out, once again, that minority race persons would have
been under-represented even if the majority had allowed the Georgia legislature to

create three districts with a minority race voter majority. See id. at 103 (Breyer, J.,
joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, E., dissenting).
98 517 U.S. 952 (1996).

1116

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 75:3

local government's need to comply with section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, which prohibits the dilution of minority race voting power, would
constitute a compelling interest that could justify a legislative district
design to enhance the voting power of racial minorities. 99
The Rehnquist Court has made rulings designed to insulate local
governments from judicial, as well as congressional, control. During
the 1990s, the Supreme Court restricted the power of the federal
courts to create effective remedies for school segregation. In 1990,
the Court in Spallone v. United States1 00 ruled that federal courts could
not impose contempt of court sanctions against members of the city
council who refused to pass legislation to implement a consent decree
for the integration of schools. Justice Brennan, one of the four dissenters, gave the majority members the benefit of the doubt concerning that intention, but he explained that the "unintended effect" of
the majority opinion would be to embolden "recalcitrant officials continually to test the ultimate reach of remedial authority of the federal
courts." 101
In 1991, the Court ruled that a lower federal court should dissolve its desegregation order in stages as soon as each part of a school
system's operation could be formally considered to have been integrated. 0 2 Justice Souter, who had recently been appointed to the
Court, did not participate in the case. Three Justices, in dissent,
found that the majority was only giving lip service to the principle that
school desegregation decrees should be continued until the effects of
legal segregation had been eliminated. 0 3 In 1995, Justice Souter
would be one of four dissenters when the Supreme Court held that a
district court exceeded its authority by ordering salary increases for
school district employees and the funding of educational programs as
a means of making city schools more likely to attract white students
04
from private schools or from other school districts.1
VII. WHAT Now?
The current Supreme Court majority has taken a states' rights
position in cases that have not involved racial discrimination. In
Boerne, whose slanted view of Fourteenth Amendment history I have
99
100

See id. at 990 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
493 U.S. 265 (1990).

101 Id. at 306 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
102

See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).

See id. at 256-57 (Marshall, J., joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
104 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note
103

46, § 18.9 (regarding school desegregation cases).

20001

THE GANG OF FIVE & THE SECOND COMING

1117

discussed previously, the Court struck down a congressional attempt
to grant persons an exemption from state or local laws with which they
disagreed for religious reasons. The Court has invalidated federal
laws when a majority of Rehnquist Court Justices could characterize
the law as an order to local governments to take legislative or executive actions. 10 5 The Gang of Five restricted the scope of the commerce power of Congress when they struck down a federal law that
made it a crime to carry a gun near schools.' 0 6 These Commerce
Clause decisions may be used to narrow or overturn civil rights legislation in the future.
In the 1999-2000 Term, will the Rehnquist Court allow the federal government to create causes of action against their attackers for
women who have been subjected to violence? 0 7 One can only hope
that the Gang of Five will not vote as a block in that case.
At the time that this Essay was written, the Court had heard, for
the second time, arguments in Reno v. BossierParishSchool Board.'0 8 In
1997, the Supreme Court ruled that the Attorney General could not
refuse to clear a change in the voting standards of the Bossier Parish
School Board (a government entity covered by section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act) solely on the basis that the new voting standard would
dilute minority race voting strength in a manner that might violate
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 10 9 The Court's opinion in Bossier
ParishSchool Board left open the question of the types of evidence that
might show that a voting change had been undertaken for the purpose of harming racial minorities. Following the remand of Bossier
ParishSchool Board, a three judge district court, by a two to one vote,
found that there was insufficient proof to establish discriminatory purpose. 1 10 The Court is now considering the question of whether the
school board's change in voting standards was enacted with the purpose of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, so
as to justify the refusal of the Attorney General to approve the voting
change.
105 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); NewYork v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992). Justice Souter joined the Gang of Five in New York v. United States,
but he dissented in Print.
106 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented in Lopez.
107 The Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), is being considered in a consolidated case currently before the Supreme Court: United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999) (consolidating cases and granting certiorari).
108 See Price v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 120 S. Ct. 866 (2000).
109 See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
110 See Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 7 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 1998).
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In 1999, Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in Lopez v.
in which the Court ruled that a county that was
covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act had to have changes in
its voting procedures approved by the Attorney General, even though
those changes were required by state law and the state was not itself
subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Justice O'Connor wrote
for six Justices in finding that this application of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was within the authority granted to Congress under the
Fifteenth Amendment and, therefore, that it did not unconstitutionally infringe on state sovereignty. Justice O'Connor's opinion recognizing Congress's Fifteenth Amendment power to prohibit changes in
state or local voting regulations that did not have a discriminatory purpose, but only a discriminatory effect, was joined without further comment by justice Scalia. Justice Thomas, in a dissentjoined by no one
else, found that this application of section 5 was "constitutionally
doubtful." He found that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement powers of Congress should be seen as "co-extensive,"
and that the application of the Voting Rights Act in the manner favored by the majority "raises to new levels the federalism cost that the
statute imposes." 112 Justice Kennedy and the ChiefJustice found that
the Voting Rights Act should be interpreted in a narrow manner.
They believed that the local jurisdiction in Lopez had to have its voting
practices reviewed by the Attorney General because of the specific circumstances in the case. However, they would have interpreted the
statute to avoid requiring all voting changes of a local government
subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to be cleared by the Attorney General. They stated that their position concerning statutory interpretation was made "in light of the constitutional concerns
11 3
identified by Justice Thomas."
The difficulty in predicting the outcome of the BossierParishcases
currently before the Supreme Court arises from the difficulty of pre1 14
dicting how Justices O'Connor and Scalia will vote.
Monterrey County,1 11

111 119 S. Ct. 693 (1999).
112 Id. at 709 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
114 After this Essay was written, the Supreme Court interpreted the Voting Rights
Act so as to prohibit the Department of Justice from denying "preclearance" to
changes in voting laws that were adopted with the intent to discriminate against minority race voters if the changes did not, in fact, reduce the voting power of racial
minorities. See Reno v. Bossier Parish, 120 S. Ct. 866 (2000). The case was decided by
a five to four vote of theJustices. Not surprisingly, the five Justices in the Bossier Parish
majority were the same five Justices who had found that white voters could have a
legislative district drawn to protect minority race voting power even though white
voters were over-represented in a legislative delegation after the creation of the dis-
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The division of the Justices and the intensity of the language in
the majority and dissenting opinions in the June 23 cases reflect a
division on the Court concerning things that are important, even if
the Eleventh Amendment is not. 115 Will the Court go all the way back
to a view of the federal system that will make it impossible for Congress to effectively protect civil liberties? Only time will tell. But the
voice of the Gang of Five that rang out on June 23, 1999 does not
strike a hopeful note for anyone interested in the protection of minority interests in our society.

trict that was designed to protect minority race voters. The Court in Bossier Parishdid
not rule on the scope of Congress's power to enact legislation under the 15th
Amendment.
115 After this Essay was written, the Supreme Court, by a predictable five to four
vote, ruled that private persons who were employed by state governments could not
sue their state employer for money damages based on the state's violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994 & Supp. III
1997). See Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000). With the increasing number of Gang of Five decisions, the 11th Amendment may have practical importance after all.
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